

# **ICD History II**

**July 1, 1946-June 30, 1947**

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## **History II**

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### Introduction

The various media of public expression, such as radio, press, publications, films, theater and music, were among the most highly Nazified enterprises in Germany. The elimination of the influences of Nazism and militarism from these media required a program of strict control and supervision. Such a program served further to secure the greatest degree of compliance with the orders of the occupying authorities by impressing upon the individual German the completeness of Germany's defeat and the impossibility of rearmament. From a long-range point of view, the control of information media was designed to guide German thinking along democratic lines and away from the doctrines of Nazism and militarism.

The term "information services" is used to denote the following media of news and opinion dissemination in Germany: newspapers, magazines, periodicals, books, pamphlets, posters, printed music and other printed or otherwise mechanically reproduced publications, sound recordings, motion picture films, news and photographic services and agencies, radio broadcasting and television stations and systems, wired radio transmission, audio-frequency distribution systems, theaters, cinemas, opera houses, film

studios, film laboratories, film exchanges, fairs, circuses, carnivals and other places of theatrical or musical entertainment and the production or presentation of motion pictures, plays, concerts, operas and other performances using actors or musicians.

The term "information services" does not include such services as post, telegraph and telephone or messages carried by such media. The activities of War Correspondents and the problems incident to the transmission of their copy to Allied countries, were not within the scope of this division.

## I. Policies

(Note: owing to an almost complete lack of documents relating to Information Control Policy, this section is intended merely as an outline in its present form.)

### A. Basic policy

Two major objectives governed the Allied authorities in the establishment of control of German information media. The first was to inculcate the German people with a sense of their own war and atrocity guilt. The second was to instil in the Germans the value of a Democratic way of life, with the establishment of eventual freedom of expression.<sup>1</sup>

As stated in the Potsdam agreement, the purposes of the occupation of

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<sup>1</sup> Potsdam Agreement, III, para 3 ii JCS 1067/6 as amended by JCS 1067/8, para 4a.

Germany were “to convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable... to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda... and to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a Democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.”<sup>2</sup>

The Potsdam agreement further stated that “subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected.”<sup>3</sup>

#### 1. Formation of Policy.

As an agreed Allied policy, the Potsdam Agreement constituted the chief directive for the control of German information services. A similar statement of these objectives was, however, made earlier in a directive issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>4</sup>

Basic information control policies for the conquered areas of Western Germany were formulated by the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF, founded on directives issued by the Office of War Information and applied

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<sup>2</sup> Potsdam Agreement, III, para 3 ii.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, III A, para 10.

<sup>4</sup> JCS 1067/6 as amended by JCS 1067/8.

under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander.<sup>5</sup> Since most of the controls were basic, they generally continued after the occupying powers assumed individual responsibility for their separate occupation areas.

## 2. Operations.

The first step taken to achieve the objectives of information control was the initial prohibition of all German information services.<sup>6</sup> This action precluded continued output by Nazis and at the same time provided opportunity for investigation and reconnaissance of personnel and equipment. Meanwhile news and instructions were disseminated to the Germans through Allied-operated radio and press.<sup>7</sup>

## 3. Nature of the Task.

Since the information services in Germany were control to further military and political objectives, there was a short term task and a long-term task.<sup>8</sup>

- a. Short-term task. Primarily military, in that it was the responsibility of the Supreme Commander.

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<sup>5</sup> Directive for Psychological Warfare and Control of German Information Services, (AG 091.412-1 PWD-AGM) (16 Apr 45). [Not in our files].

<sup>6</sup> Military Government Law No. 191

<sup>7</sup> ICS, USGCC, "Basic Preliminary Plan for Allied Control Council and Occupation of Germany" (15 Feb 45), Annex X, I, para 3 c (Not to be used as a final reference).

<sup>8</sup> USGCC Directive "Administration of Military Government in the U.S. Zone in Germany" (7 July 45), Section XXI as revised 22 October 1945, para 4 and 5.

- 1) Prohibition of all German information services.
  - 2) Establishment of necessary American information services.
- b. Long-term task. Primarily political. Governed by the control Council.
- 1) Demilitarization and denazification of German information services.
  - 2) Presentation of German guilt.
  - 3) Preparation for reconstruction of Germany on a Democratic basis.

#### 4. Execution of Policies: Phases.<sup>9</sup>

- a. Phase I. Prohibition of German information media, according to provisions of Military Government Law No. 191.
- b. Phase II. Use of Allied information services and reconnaissance of German information services.
- c. Phase III. Gradual transfer of responsibility for the conduct of German information services to Germans.

#### 5. Licensing Procedure under Information Control Regulation No. 1.

- a. Activities.

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid, para 6.

- b. Authority of Granting Licenses.
- c. Revocation of Licenses.

6. Registration Procedure.

7. Supervision of Licensed German Information Services.

- a. Policy and Operating Instructions.
- b. Post Production Scrutiny.

8. Suitable Personnel (Denazification).

B. Directives.

1. Directive No. 1. Issued by Psychological Warfare Division, 22 May 1945.
2. Directive No. 2. Issued by Psychological Warfare Division, 28 May 1945.
3. Directive No. 3. Issued by Psychological Warfare Division, 22 June 1945.
4. Directive No. 4. Issued by Information Control Division, 4 September 1945 .

C. Policy Changes.

## II. ORGANIZATION

Upon the dissolution of SHAEF on 14 July 1945, the Information Control Division was established as successor to the Psychological Warfare Division.<sup>10</sup> Long before this date, however, plans had been formulated for the control of information media in Germany.

### A. Allied Control Authority Level

In November 1944, the European Advisory Commission, through its various delegations, issued a directive concerning the control of public information in Germany.<sup>11</sup> Addressed to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied forces of occupation, this directive set forth the information control objectives and policies which were to be enforced in Germany by the Control Council. (The phrase "Control Council" referred to the three Allied Commanders-in-Chief acting jointly).

On 15 March 1945 the Information Control Division was officially established as a separate division in the US Group Control Council, on the Coordinating Committee level.<sup>12</sup>

### B. Theater Level.

While planning was still in progress at SHAEF for the organization of the

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<sup>10</sup> USFET GO 154 (14 Jul 45).

<sup>11</sup> EAC Draft Directive (22 Nov 44).

<sup>12</sup> ETOUSA GO 36 (15 Mar 45)

United States Theater Headquarters following the cessation of hostilities, it was considered advisable to establish a separate staff division for the control of German information media. Thus on 12 May 1945 the Information Control Division was established as a Special Staff Division of ETOUSA.<sup>13</sup>

On 1 July 1945, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations (ETOUSA) was redesignated Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater, and the Information Control Division became a special staff division of USFET.<sup>14</sup> Prior to the dissolution of SHAEF, however, information control functions were it executed by the Psychological Warfare Division. Upon the dissolution of the Allied command, 14 July, the Psychological Warfare Division ceased to exist but its staff continued to function as the Information Control Division.

There was, of course, a difference in the objectives of the Psychological Warfare Division and those of the Information Control Division. During the combat phase the mission of Psychological Warfare had been to assist in breaking down the will of the enemy to resist, using radio, leaflets, and other media.

After the cessation of hostilities, the task of Information Control was to help to reestablish order, to furnish information, and, from a long-range point of view, to re-educate the German people in the democratic use of

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<sup>13</sup> ETOUSA GO 90 (12 Mar 45)

<sup>14</sup> ETOUSA GO 130 (20 June 45).

information media.

C. Basic Responsibilities.

The Information Control Division had three basic responsibilities.<sup>15</sup> First, it was responsible for obtaining agreement for uniform or coordinated policies with respect to control of public information media in Germany. Second, it was to determine and coordinate policy on the control and reconstitution of German information services in US controlled areas. Third, it was responsible for obtaining and reporting through information control channels and for making available to the Director of Intelligence, information in five fields.

These fields were: German reaction and attitudes toward American Military Government and German Civil Government; German political activity, including purposes, programs and leaders, in the US zone and throughout Germany; evidence of trends towards nationalism, militarism, pan-Germanism and fascism; separatist movements; and political effects of refugee movements.

D. Functions.

The Information Control Division had three primary functions:<sup>16</sup> to maintain liaison with the US Political Adviser on policy matters; to provide

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<sup>15</sup> [OMGUS Organization Plan (9 Mar 46)].

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

policy guidance to, and functional supervision over, the Offices of Military Government at lower echelons regarding Information Control matters; and to control and guide the reconstitution of German information services.

E. Internal Organization.

Although various minor changes in organization took place during the first year of operation, the Information Control Division in general was divided into two groups, the staff group and the operating group.<sup>17</sup>

1. Staff Group.

The staff group included three branches: Plans and Directives, Intelligence and Liaison, and Administration and Personnel.

The Plans and Directives Branch was responsible for the preparation of plans, policies and directives, as well as for coordination with other agencies. The Intelligence and Liaison Branch was responsible for the direction of such information gathering activities as were necessary in the performance of Information Control functions, for the formulation of procedures governing political reporting, for the exchange of information with other agencies and for the allocation and dissemination of information received from the field.

2. Operating Group.

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<sup>17</sup> OMGUS Organization Plan (5 Dec 45).

The operating group of the Information Control Division was composed of the branches responsible for the control of various information media. They were: Press Control Branch, Publications Control Branch, Radio Control Branch, and Film, Theater and Music Control Branch, as well as the Business Management Branch.

a) Press Control.

The Press Control Branch was responsible for the formulation of policy and for supervisory activities incident to the operations of the news services and newspapers. It was also charged with control and guidance of the reconstitution of the German press.<sup>18</sup> In addition it supervised the preparation of an official news file which was transmitted to the radio stations and newspapers in the American Areas of Occupation.

b) Publications Control.

The Publications Control Branch was responsible for US participation in the preparation and execution of policies governing German periodicals and book publishing activities.<sup>19</sup> It was charged with control and guidance of the reconstitution of German publications. It also formulated policy and controlled the activities of German book and

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

magazine publishers.

c) Radio Control.

The Radio Control Branch was responsible for technical and editorial supervision of all radio broadcasting stations in the United States Zone.<sup>20</sup>

d) Film, Theater and Music Control.

The preparation of policies governing the reconstitution of German theater, films and music was the responsibility of the Film, Theater and Music Control Branch. It controlled the importation, distribution and presentation of films, music and plays shown to German audiences, and it prepared policies for the suppression of objectionable films, music and plays.<sup>21</sup>

e) Business Management.

The Business Management Branch was responsible for activities concerning business management, including property control problems relating to US operated and licensed German information services. Another important function was the coordination of negotiations necessary for securing the supply of newsprint, paper stocks and

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

printing materials needed for US and German-produced publications. This branch was also responsible for coordinating policies regarding financial control of US and German-operated information services.<sup>22</sup>

#### F. Organizational Units.

In carrying out its functions, the Information Control Division was required to perform operations which were not usual in a military staff division. It therefore became necessary to provide a separate self-contained unit to carry out technical operational responsibilities associated with the restoration of information services. This unit was the Division's Information Control Detachment, located at Bad Nauheim.<sup>23</sup> It was staffed by technicians and professional men and women in all fields of information, both Allied civilians and military.

Operations in the field were carried out by two District Information Services Control Commands.<sup>24</sup> One, the 6870<sup>st</sup> DISCC, controlled the Eastern Military District. The other, the 6871<sup>st</sup> DISCC, controlled the Western Military District.

These two commands, which formerly carried out the same missions for the Psychological Warfare Division, functioned under the jurisdiction of the

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<sup>22</sup> OMGUS Organization Plan (9 Mar 46)

<sup>23</sup> Press material prepared for US Publishers, by ICD, no date. [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents at present missing from files.]

<sup>24</sup> SHAEF Letter AG, 091.412-1 PWD-AG, M, appendix "B" (9 June 45).

Commanding Generals of each Military District.<sup>25</sup>

Like the Information Control Division itself, each DISCC consisted of sections and subsections in charge of intelligence, plans and operations, press, publications, radio, films, theater and music. Numerous small units, composed of specialist personnel under the jurisdiction of the DISCCs, were stationed in 10 of the largest cities in the US Zone, and in Bremen.

#### G. Organizational Change.

On 11 December 1945, the information control division entered a new stage of its operations, when it ceased to be a Special Staff Division of USFET and became a part of Military Government.<sup>26</sup> The transfer of the Division from USFET to OMGUS was, on the surface, purely administrative and involved no change in ICD's mission or method. This was, of course, true. The change also, however, marked the beginning of the long-term policy for Germany, when the functions of military government would be separated from those of security forces and the information media would gradually be turned over to the Germans.

### III. INTELLIGENCE

#### A. Background

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Hq USFET GO 331 (11 Dec 45)

During hostilities, the Intelligence Section was charged with reporting on the attitude of German soldiers, and later of German civilians, by interrogation and document research.<sup>27</sup>

## B. Organization

The Intelligence Branch<sup>28</sup> of the Office of the Director of Information Control, as it was later termed, was divided into two sections. The first, the Reports and Analysis Section, was responsible for reporting on German public opinion and attitudes, and on German political trends. The second, the Denazification Section, was responsible for the elimination of Nazis, nationalists and militarists from the information services.

The field work involved in these operations was done by men attached to Military Government in the three *Länder*, in Berlin and in Bremen. They operated under directions from the Information Control Division headquarters.

## C. Problems

The Intelligence Branch was faced with three outstanding problems:<sup>29</sup> a shortage of personnel, difficulties in denazification in the information services, and the problem of exchange of information between the four occupying

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<sup>27</sup> ICD publicity background Material, prepared for touring US Publishers. [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents at present missing from files.]

<sup>28</sup> OMGUS Organization Plan, File AG 320.3-1 (12 Oct 45)

<sup>29</sup> USGCC ICS Report "Information Control in Germany" (25 Sept 45).

powers.

The personnel situation was considered the greatest handicap to successful completion of the Intelligence mission, owing to the withdrawal of key personnel. The task of denazification was complicated by the pressure on the Intelligence Branch to lower standards so that German information services could be turned over to the Germans.

The exchange of information between the four occupying powers on personalities in the field was an equally serious problem, since there was no machinery by which people who were blacklisted in the American area were automatically blacklisted in the French, British and Russian areas. The Information Control Division furnished black lists to the other three powers, but received no information in return. Furthermore the lists compiled by the division were not binding upon the other powers.

#### D. Reports and Analysis

##### 1. Political Trends

One of the main responsibilities of the Reports and Analysis Section concerned reports and German political trends.<sup>30</sup> A handful of experienced interrogators in the field made weekly reports on developments in German politics. Their reports covered the activities of the four main political groups in Germany, the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the Christian

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<sup>30</sup> MG Monthly Report, No 13 (20 Aug 46).

Democratic Union and the Liberal Democratic Party. The political investigations, in addition, attempted to measure the reactions of German politicians to the actions of Military Government.

## 2. Public Opinion Surveys

In the initial phase of the occupation it was found necessary to devise some means of learning the current attitudes of the German population. Methods of discovering public opinion were first limited in scope, but in October 1945 sampling surveys of the US Zone were inaugurated.<sup>31</sup>

Conducted by the Surveys Unit along the lines of the scientific polls made in the United States, these surveys were made weekly, among a representative sample of one thousand Germans. The compilation of the results was handled by American personnel. The Germans did not see the final results, except those which were released to the public. The interrogations in the field were done by approximately 70 German civilians, supervised by five Americans in the entire US zone. Although communications to the field were extremely poor, when a major development occurred it was possible for the German reaction within a few days [sic].

Public opinion surveys were made on numerous subjects, some of which were:

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<sup>31</sup> ICD Report of visiting US Publishers (no date) . [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents at present missing from files.]

a. Major Concerns:

Missing relatives and the scarcity of food were of equal concern to the Germans until the food cut of 1 April when the proportion of people worrying about food approximately doubled. In general, material well-being was consistently of more immediate concern to the populace than any other one topic.

b. Denazification:

This was approved by about half the adults polled; the German public wanted the occupying power to retain ultimate responsibility for impartial handling of the program, however, leaving only individual decisions and operation to Germans.

c. The Nuremberg Trials:

These were thought to be conducted in an orderly manner. Most people felt that all the accused would be found guilty, and generally agreed that they were guilty and deserved punishment.

d. Concentration camp features:

Most Germans in the zone who had seen the atrocity film *Mills of Death* were convinced of its veracity; a small minority considered it propaganda.

e. Fear of rising prices:

Most Germans thought that with proper measures price rises could

be controlled.

f. Radio listening habits:

Germans on the whole were found to approve the US controlled radio, and were particularly interested in programs which explained the American democratic system.

g. The Black Market:

Most Germans felt that the Occupation Authorities were doing all in their power to curb the Black Market.

h. Destruction of war industries:

Most Germans disapproved of the level of Industry Law and failed to understand that one of its chief intents was to destroy Germany's war potential.

In general, the opinion surveys indicated that most Germans did not accept the proposition that the German nation at large was guilty of the war and the crimes committed under Nazi leadership; most of them thought that neither they nor their friends were personally responsible for such matters. They were inclined to blame their former leaders, particularly those now dead. The surveys also showed that the majority of Germans believed that the underlying idea of Nazism was good, but was badly carried out in practice.

Opinion surveys showed that some of the populace held opinions

generally similar to those prevalent in democratic nations, but that the majority was still infected with ideas resulting from twelve years of Nazi indoctrination and from the German militaristic tradition.

#### E. Denazification

The task of the Denazification Section was to insure that no Nazis, militarists, dangerous nationalists or subversive elements obtained employment with the information services in Germany.<sup>32</sup> In some fields of Military Government it was necessary to revive essential services as soon as possible, even with the help of Nazi-tainted Germans, and later to eliminate those with unsatisfactory political backgrounds. Information Control, on the other hand, operating under Military Government Law No. 191, first shut down all newspapers, radio stations, theaters and publishing houses, thereby dispensing from the very beginning with the services of thousands of editors, script writers, musicians, publishers and others who had been employed by the Nazi Propaganda Ministry.

For several months news was brought to the German people by American operated newspapers and radio stations. Later, after screening, non-Nazis who had either suffered at the hands of the Nazis or who had shown a clear record of opposition to the regime were gradually employed to serve as the backbone of the reconstituted German information services, for

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<sup>32</sup> Information Control Regulation No. 1 SHAEF Letter, AG 091.412-1 PWD-AGM Appendix "A" (9 June 45).

Information Control, the task was one of selection of the right people, rather than elimination of the wrong ones.

## 1. Method

In general the task of examining German's was carried out by lower units which required candidates for positions to fill out personal history questionnaires, and supplemented these with interrogations of the individual and of his present and past associates.<sup>33</sup> Some examining, usually termed "vetting", was however done by the denazification staff of the Information Control Division.

A careful investigation was made of every person to whom a license was issued. All important editors and executives received special attention. After a man was investigated in his own community, his records were checked against the files of Nazi party members in Berlin, as well against the files of the *Reichskulturkammer* (National Chamber of Culture).<sup>34</sup> Everyone who had worked in information services under the Nazis was forced to belong to one branch of this organization. The files contained detailed dossiers on the careers of many of their members. Thus it was possible to discover that applicants for positions in the information field who had denied affiliation with the Nazi Party were actually regarded by the Nazis as loyal party members.

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<sup>33</sup> ICD Report of visiting US Publishers (no date) . [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents at present missing from files.]

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

## 2. Screening Center

This system of determining the suitability of a candidate was not always foolproof, however. The Information Control Screening Center was therefore established in October, 1945.<sup>35</sup> Located at Bad Homburg, this Center was staffed by a trained political investigator, a psychologist, and a German-speaking American psychiatrist.

Candidates for important positions in the various information media were sent to the Center for a two-day examination. Certain tests were developed which gave investigators an insight into an individual's political orientation. In addition, political background and private life were scrutinized.

The results of these investigations were filed in Berlin. All individuals in the information field were classified and their names published in "Black, Grey and White Lists". The first of these was published by the psychological warfare division at SHAEF in November 1944 and included the names of leading Nazis in the information fields. In July, 1945 the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section of the 12th Army Group published its first Black List of fifty names. In October the first "Black, Grey and White List", was released by the intelligence branch of the Information Control Division. This was later supplemented by lists published throughout the year.

## 3. Registration

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<sup>35</sup> Information Control Regulation No. 1 (9 June 45).

With respect to applicants for minor positions in the information fields, such as that of printers, book dealer or film distributor, it was necessary for a candidate only to register with military government and to fill out a standard *Fragebogen* (questionnaire).<sup>36</sup> Unless this questionnaire disclosed membership in important Nazi organizations, the applicant was usually given clearance to apply for the position. Because this screening was more perfunctory, however, it was usually necessary to continue examination of the registrant's record even after initial clearance was given. Such investigation occasionally disclosed new facts purposely omitted from the *Fragebogen*, which automatically disqualified the individual involved. This occurred in Berlin during February, when there was a thorough re-screening of managers and operators of film theaters and of new employees for the *Drahtfunk* (radio). Of 79 cases examined in the motion picture field, 16 were removed. Of the 44 *Drahtfunk* employees screened, 11 were recommended for immediate dismissal.<sup>37</sup>

#### F. Special Studies

As a background for political, public opinion and Nazi investigations, the Information Control Division attempted to build up a body of scientific

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<sup>36</sup> MG Monthly Report (Feb 46). [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents at present missing from files.]

<sup>37</sup> ICD Report of visiting US Publishers (no date). [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents at present missing from files.]

information concerning the German mind. For this project a special staff was employed, consisting of a prominent American psychiatrist, an American psychologist and two sociological anthropologists. An attempt was made to analyze the German mind, and the effect of environment on political attitudes. A series of tests was devised by the psychologist to measure the relative "denazification" of German youth, German women, ex-soldiers and so on. The anthropologists made a detailed field study covering German community life and home life. In one study, for instance, a group of German children were asked to write a composition on what they hoped for the political future of Germany. It was assumed that these children would have few political opinions of their own and would set forth the ideas to which they were being exposed at home. The compositions revealed that in almost all of the homes Nazi ideas were still being taught to children.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

## IV. PRESS

### A. General

#### 1. Scope.

Press Control includes the control of the management, productions, contents, and distribution of all newspapers, wall sheets, news posters, news leaflets, and news picture displays, as well as the control of the activities or operation of all news and photographic services and agencies.<sup>39</sup>

#### 2. Tasks.

The principal tasks of Press Control are to find and recommend suitable Germans to be licensed as newspaper publishers and operators of news and photographic services and to control and guide the reconstitution of the German press.<sup>40</sup>

### B. Newspapers

#### 1. First Phase: Prohibition of German Information Services.

From the moment the Western Allies set foot on German soil newspapers, as well as all other forms of information media, were

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<sup>39</sup> MG Regulations, Title 21, para 21-300.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, para 21 – 301

prohibited.<sup>41</sup>

## 2. Second Phase: Overt Newspapers.

During this blackout, however, it was essential to have some means of giving the Germans necessary orders and factual news. Newspapers were therefore published during the combat phase and for a short period thereafter by the psychological warfare staffs of the three Army Groups under the overall supervision of the Psychological Warfare Division at Supreme Headquarters.<sup>42</sup>

On 14 July, when the United States Army took over its zone of occupation, publication of these official "overt" newspapers became the responsibility of the Information Control Division. On that day 10 newspapers were being published, with a combined circulation of over 3 million.<sup>43</sup>

These newspapers were designed to serve merely as a stop-gap until the information services could be turned over to suitable Germans. When the first German newspaper was licensed on 31 July in Frankfurt, the overt newspaper there ceased publication. By late September there were only five official newspapers left. Mid-November saw the end of all but one of the overt newspapers. The one remaining newspaper was the *Neue Zeitung*. Established in October, it was designed to serve throughout the occupation as

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<sup>41</sup> Military Government Law No. 191 (No Date)

<sup>42</sup> USFET directive, "administration of military government in the US zone in Germany" section XXI AGO 014.1 G, EC-AGO (revised 22 Oct 45)

<sup>43</sup> MG Monthly Report, No. 1 (20 Aug 45)

the official organ of the United States Military Government, and to present an example of American standards of journalism.

### 3. Third Phase: German Newspapers.

Reconstruction of a democratic German press was an essential element in the huge task of re-educating the German people. The first step in the transition from complete American supervision to German control was the selection of suitable Germans to be licensed as newspaper publishers.

#### a. Licensing.

The first German newspaper to be licensed in the US zone was the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, on 31 July 1945.<sup>44</sup> Seven men representing various shades of democratic political thought, were made jointly responsible for its operation and an initial circulation of almost half a million copies enabled it to cover a large part of Greater Hesse. Newspapers in other large cities followed during the next few months, always with initially large circulations and published by a group of licensees who were pledged not to support any particular political party, but to afford opportunities of expression to all non-Nazi points of view.<sup>45</sup>

(MG. Reg. No. 1)

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid

<sup>45</sup> MG Regulations, Title 21, para 21-323

b. Personnel.

More important than the mere physical establishment of newspapers was the development of technical competence and editorial confidence among licensed publishers and their employees.

Since the Goebbels Propaganda Ministry had pressed nearly all newspapermen into its service and otherwise disposed of those who would not cooperate, Military Government was at first forced to rely largely on inexperienced personnel to organize the German press. Licensed papers were amateurish and made frequent mistakes in news evaluation and presentation.

By June 1946, however, newspapers were taking a vigorous part in the life of their communities, and were increasingly able to solve their own problems. Courses in journalism were being given. The newspaper publishers' associations, which had been formed in each *Land*, had also assumed responsibility for dealing with a number of matters which had formerly been referred to Military Government.<sup>46</sup>

c. Circulation.

As papers were established in smaller centers, the circulation areas and total circulation of nearby papers were generally reduced.

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<sup>46</sup> MG Monthly Report No. 12 (20 July 46) [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents at present missing from files].

The total circulation of the press therefore remained fairly constant, at approximately 4 million during the first six months in 1946, although the number of individual papers had increased.<sup>47</sup> At the end of June, 35 newspapers had been licensed in the US zone.

Owing to the serious shortage of newsprint, newspapers appeared only two or three times a week, in editions of from four to six pages. The only exception to this rule was the Berlin *Tagesspiegel*, which appeared six times a week.

Until the spring of 1946, no city had more than one newspaper. In April a second newspaper was licensed in Frankfurt. Establishment of this additional newspaper marked a significant development in Military Government's program to facilitate the growth of Democratic Information Services, for it emphasized the desirability of a competitive press in Germany.

#### d. Post-Publication Scrutiny.

American Military Government never imposed Pre-publication censorship on the German press. Each publisher was handed a page of instructions forbidding him to criticize Military Government or to publish material that would foster disrespect for the occupying powers or foment riot or disorder. Within these limits he was free to present all

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid

news and comments.<sup>48</sup>

However, in order to ensure that licensed newspapers were living up to these terms, and also in order to correct journalistic mistakes, the press was subjected to rigid post-publication scrutiny by American press control officers.

Violations of Military Government directives were for the most part minor. More frequently press control officers found it necessary to advise on news policy and treatment. During January, for example, several papers were instructed to keep their news and editorial comment separate. Some editors fail to identify political handouts as such, or to get the source for news. One paper was warned that it would have to increase world news coverage.

### C. Press Organizations

A significant event in the field of German press occurred on 20 October, 1945, when a conference of 45 licensed publishers and editors was held at Marburg. For the first time in twelve years German newspapermen assembled to discuss mutual problems and policies freely. At this meeting plans were made for the reestablishment of a Publishers' and Editors' Association such as existed in Germany before 1932. The first Press Association was founded in

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<sup>48</sup> ICD Policy Instruction No. 2 (? Sept 45)

Bavaria in November.<sup>49</sup>

D. DANA, the German News Service (MG Report No. 1, p. 2).

A sound Democratic press would be unable to exist unless fed by free news services. The absence of any such news service in Germany made it necessary for information control authorities to found one before German publish newspapers could appear. In June 1945 the foundations were laid at Bad Nauheim, for the *Deutsche Allgemeine Nachrichten Agentur* [sic] or German News Service, usually known as DANA.<sup>50</sup>

At first entirely under the control of US personnel, by the end of June 1945 DANA had hired and trained almost 150 German employees, and preparations were almost complete to license it as a German operation.

E. Newspapers for Displaced Persons.

When the Allies liberated the displaced persons in Germany, some means of supplying them with information was needed. At first, during the Supreme Headquarters period, multilingual leaflets were distributed. These were later replaced by a quadri-lingual newspaper called "SHAEF." When the Information Control Division assumed responsibility for newspapers for

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<sup>49</sup> 6870 DISCC, Report No. 24 (21 Nov 45)

<sup>50</sup> ICIS No 25 (5 Jan 46)

displaced persons, most of its efforts were concentrated upon two weekly papers in Polish.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> USGCC, ICS, Report "Information Control in Germany" (25 Sept 45)

## V. PUBLICATIONS

### A. General

#### 1. Scope.

Publications control included the control of the management, production, contents, and distribution of all books, pamphlets, magazines and periodicals, and the control of the activities or operation of all commercial lending libraries.<sup>52</sup>

#### 2. Principal Tasks.

The principal tasks of Publications Control were to find and recommend suitable Germans to be licensed as publishers, to prevent the circulation of objectionable literature, and to control and guide the reconstruction of the German publishing industry.<sup>53</sup>

These tasks were complicated by several factors. The first was the fact that many bookstores and printing plants had been destroyed or badly damaged by bombing. The supply of paper was also exceedingly limited. In addition the search for qualified German publishers with clear political records showed that the number of such individuals was small at the start of the occupation.

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<sup>52</sup> MG Regulations, Title 21, para 21-400

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, para 21-401

### 3. Procedure.

#### a. First Phase.

Publication of books and magazines was, of course, initially prohibited.<sup>54</sup>

#### b. Second Phase.

Operational procedures for licensing publishers of books and magazines were first worked out by the Psychological Warfare Division<sup>55</sup> and were later supplemented by instructions issued on 7 August 1945 by the Information Control Division. All desirable publishers were encouraged to apply for licenses. After thorough investigation lists of those who had been approved were to be published in the *Börsenblatt für den deutschen Buchhandel* (the official "Journal for the German Booktrade").<sup>56</sup>

A method was also devised for approval of manuscripts as well as for the stocks of books on hand in bookstores.

Printers were to be registered, not licensed.<sup>57</sup> They could produce books, pamphlets and magazines only on contract with licensed publishers. Distributors were also required to register, in

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<sup>54</sup> Military Government Law No. 191

<sup>55</sup> Information Control Regulation No. 1, PWD, SHAEF, letter AG 091.412-1 PWD-AGM, Appendix "A" (9 June 45) [Notes 4-6 are out of order in the original. While the location of the notes is given, the exact ordering of the information is somewhat unclear. Analysis of the text indicates that this is the most likely ordering of the information provided in the original.

<sup>56</sup> MG Monthly Report, ICD, No. 7 (20 Feb 46) [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents missing at present].

<sup>57</sup> Ibid

accordance with Information Control instruction No. 1.

c. Third Phase.

The first publishing licenses were granted on 13 July 1945 to representatives of four religious denominations in the Munich area allowing them to publish catechisms, hymn books and other religious literature. By the end of June 1946 nearly 250 publishers had been licensed and had produced over 1000 books and pamphlets and some 130 periodicals.<sup>58</sup>

B. Magazines.

1. American Magazines.

Because the number of suitable German publishers was small at the beginning of the occupation, many of those licensed during the year were inexperienced and were slow to produce effective periodicals of uniformly good quality. To help in filling this vacuum, four publications were issued under American sponsorship, first by the Psychological Warfare Division and later by the Information Control Division. The initial issue of a pictorial weekly

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<sup>58</sup> MG Monthly Report, ICD, No. 13 (20 Aug 46) [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents missing at present].

called *Heute* (Today), a magazine somewhat like *LIFE*, was produced in London in the early summer of 1945, and later in the Military Government printing plant in Munich. Production of a monthly intellectual review called *Amerikanische Rundschau*, similar to *HARPER'S* or *THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY*, was begun in Munich. This was followed by a joint British-American publication entitled *Neue Auslese* ("Recent Selections") which was planned along the lines of the *Reader's Digest*.<sup>59</sup>

## 2. German Magazines.

The first German periodicals in the US Zone appeared in October 1945. Nearly 40 applications were received for the licensing of periodicals, and 17 were actually granted.<sup>60</sup>

Particular encouragement was given to possible publishers of four types of periodicals: those for women, for youth, the illustrated, and the "thought" variety. The first magazine to appear was *Die Wandlung* ("Change"), a literary and scholarly publication. Its first issue was composed of the text of the Potsdam Declaration, an article denouncing Nazi racial theories, a diary of a 1945 trip through Germany, the translations of two poems by T.S. Eliot, and an essay on verse.

Among the other important licensed magazines published by the

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid

<sup>60</sup> MG Monthly Report, ICD, No. 4 (20 Nov 45) [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents missing at present].

Germans during this first year were *Horizont* ("Horizon"), a youth magazine, *Sie* ("She"), a women's magazine, *Frankfurter Hefte* ("Frankfurt Notebook"), a journal of opinion, and *Stuttgarter Rundschau* ("Stuttgart Review"), a general cultural magazine.

Two youth magazines of the twelve being published at the end of June 1946, namely *Horizont* and *Pinguin* ("Penguin"), were being distributed throughout the US zone.<sup>61</sup>

## C. Books.

### 1. Problems.

As in the field of magazines, innumerable problems cropped up in the field of book publishers and booksellers. Among them were lack of experienced qualified personnel, shortage of paper, necessary elimination of many objectionable books, and a lack of good manuscripts.<sup>62</sup> To fill this gap, during the first six months of occupation the Office of War Information supplied approximately 35,000 copies of each of 25 American books in German translation.

### 2. New German Books.

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<sup>61</sup> MG Monthly Report, ICD, No. 13 (20 Aug 46) [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents missing at present]. In the manuscript there is no indication where Note 10 is to appear. After comparing other notes and examining dates given, this is most likely where it should have appeared.

<sup>62</sup> ICD, USGCC Report, "Information Control in Germany" (25 Sept 45)

In spite of the difficulties encountered, by the beginning of July 1946, 729 books and pamphlets had been published. Important new German books included Radbruch's *Der Geist des englischen Rechts* ("The Spirit of English Law"), *Führer und Verführte* ("The Leader and the Mised"), a book by Hans Windisch analyzing German social politics; *Zur Genesung des deutschen Wesens* ("The Rebirth of the German Spirit") by Karl Barth, Protestant theologian; and *Die Idee der Universität* ("The Idea of the University") by Karl Jaspers, prominent philosopher and psychoanalyst. A large number of novels, stories, poetry and drama of many periods and nations has also been printed.

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### 3. Elimination of Nazi Literature.

All publications of a Nazi and militaristic nature were to be confiscated and destroyed, according to the provisions of the Allied Control Council Order No. 4. Most of the provisions of this order were carried out under directives issued by Military Government. Lists of works of a Nazi or militaristic nature were being compiled. Some of these were to be sent to the Library of Congress. The remainder were held for pulping, to augment existing paper stocks. Strict orders were issued against "book burning." Owners of private libraries in homes were encouraged to submit objectionable publications

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<sup>63</sup> MG Monthly Report, ICD, No. 13 (20 June 46) [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents missing at present].

voluntarily.<sup>64</sup>

In an attempt to cleanse book stores and lending libraries of these books, Military Government carried out a series of "raids" between mid-February and the end of March in Bavaria. It was found that approximately one third of the establishments actually had one or more objectionable books on sale or available for loan.<sup>65</sup>

Offenders lost their registration certificates, and in many cases their property was taken over by Property Control for disposition to custodians who could be relied upon to purge the stocks.

#### D. Booktrade Associations, "Börsenverein".

The development of German booktrade associations was considered essential by the information control division, for not until Germans could be made responsible for the regulation of prices, discounts, the storage of book stocks and transportation could any effective resumption of the booktrade take place. One of the chief problems in organizing such an association was the fact that many of the leading personalities in the former "Börsenverein" or Book Trade Association, had been closely associated with the Nazis. However, in spite of such difficulties, on 8 October 1945 a meeting of German

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid, General, No. 11 (20 June 46) [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents missing at present]. Ibid

<sup>65</sup> Ibid, ICD, No. 9 (20 Apr 46) [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents missing at present].

publishers and American control officers was held at Stuttgart, where plans were made for reorganizing the *Börsenverein* along democratic lines.<sup>66</sup>

#### E. Public Opinion Surveys.

The field of publications was a highly important means of reeducation, since the Germans have always been avid readers of books. In January 1946, a large number of publishers throughout the US Zone were interviewed and asked what publications were most important for German readers.<sup>67</sup>

The consensus of opinion was that chief stress should be placed on fundamental humanitarian ideals as a basis for political regeneration. This required publication of selected classical works, such as those of Goethe and Schiller, and of new books and articles dealing with current problems. Translation and publication rights for some 40 carefully selected American titles were sold to licensed German publishers. One of the titles, D.W. Brogan's *American Character*, sold 10,000 copies in German translation within three weeks of its appearance, and others also proved popular.

Although it was not possible to permit political parties, trade unions and churches to publish full-scale newspapers, several such organizations were active in producing magazines and leaflets.

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<sup>66</sup> 6870 DISCC Weekly Report (12 Oct 45).

<sup>67</sup> MG Monthly Report, ICD, No. 13 (20 June 46) [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents missing at present].

#### F. US Information Centers.

In order to increase the supply of non-Nazi reading material, US Information Centers and reading rooms were established throughout the US zone. The first was opened in September 1945 (?), and by the end of June 1946 nine of them were in operation. These centers carried a wide range of reference books and a representative group of current titles and periodicals, both scientific and popular.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid, No. 12 (20 July 46) MG Monthly Report, ICD, No. 13 (20 June 46) [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents missing at present].

## VI. RADIO

### 1. Scope.

Radio control included the control of all German broadcasting media which could be heard by the general German public, and control of wired radio transmission, television stations and systems, and audio-frequency distribution systems.<sup>69</sup>

### 2. Principal Task.

The principal task of Radio Control was to guide and control the reconstitution of German broadcasting.<sup>70</sup>

### 3. Background.

On July 14, 1945 the information control division inherited from SHAEF three radio stations then broadcasting in Germany, as well as the powerful Radio Luxembourg. Radio Munich had been opened on 12 May 1945, Radio Frankfurt on 2 June, and Radio Stuttgart on 3 June.<sup>71</sup> All depended initially on relay programs originated at Radio Luxembourg for the greater part of their broadcasting schedules. On 11 November 1945, Radio Luxembourg was

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<sup>69</sup> MG Regulations Title 21, para 21-500

<sup>70</sup> Ibid, para 21-501

<sup>71</sup> ICS, USGCC Report "Information Control in Germany" (25 Sept 45)

turned back to the Duchy of Luxembourg,<sup>72</sup> and at that time Radio Frankfurt became the key station of a network called the *Süddeutsche Rundfunk* (“South German Network”).

#### 4. Problems.

The task of reconstitution of the German radio was complicated by a number of problems. Denazification took its toll of experienced technical and artistic personnel. Damage to land lines cause transmission failure. Other technical equipment was also damaged or unobtainable.<sup>73</sup> Radio Stuttgart, for example, was forced to broadcast from a mobile studio for several months while facilities were created in a requisitioned office building.<sup>74</sup>

#### 5. Organization.

##### a. *Süddeutsche Rundfunk* (South German Network).

A radio network was established and named the *Süddeutsche Rundfunk*. It was first composed of the radio stations at Frankfurt, Stuttgart and Munich. During the year three more stations were added: one at Nuremberg, synchronized with Radio Munich; another at Bremen to provide Military Government with radio service for the Enclave; and the

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<sup>72</sup> Cable ICD, USFET, SC-1770, (27 Oct 45)

<sup>73</sup> ICS, USGCC Report “Information Control in Germany” (25 Sept 45)

<sup>74</sup> MG Monthly ICD Report No. 13 (20 Aug 46) [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents missing at present].

*Drahtfunk* ("Wired Wireless") in the US sector of Berlin.<sup>75</sup>

b. Operation.

The three major stations -- Munich, Stuttgart and Frankfurt -- were begun as military operations<sup>76</sup> with the assistance of the few acceptable qualified German personnel who could be found. Training of German personnel to take on operating responsibility was undertaken as part of a plan for reconstitution of the broadcasting stations as German corporations.

c. Network Control.

In addition, a Network Control Office was organized to supervise, guide and coordinate the implementation of policy by the various stations. The control officers at the stations examined all scripts before broadcast, and the Network Control Office maintained a post broadcast scrutiny and directed network broadcasts. Additional post-broadcast scrutiny and spot monitoring were conducted by Content Analysis unit, which also surveyed German language broadcasts beamed to Germany from outside the US Zone.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> MG Monthly Report, ICD, No. 8 (20 Mar 46) [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents missing at present]. (see also Cable, OMGUS, ref CC-5651, (24 May 46)

<sup>76</sup> USFET letter, AG 312.3 GAP-AGO (6 Sept 45)

<sup>77</sup> MG Monthly ICD Report No. 13 (20 Aug 46)

## 6. Programs.

During the first year of operation, considerable progress was made in rehabilitating the German radio. The number of hours of weekly broadcasting time represented by Radio Frankfurt, for example, increased from 63 hours at the outset to 116 hours by July 1946. Radio Stuttgart raised its time from 28 to 116 hours a week. Radio Munich, which was broadcasting only 12 hours a week in the beginning, was on the air 100 hours a week at the end of June 1946.

Balanced schedules were also inaugurated in order to maintain the entertainment value of radio and at the same time to carry out occupation aims. An analysis of Radio Munich programs illustrates this balance. Music occupied slightly over 52% of the broadcasting time. Twenty-one percent was devoted to news and public affairs. The remainder of the time was devoted to programs for women, youth and children; literary, dramatic and educational programs; and Polish language broadcasts for displaced persons.<sup>78</sup>

## 7. German Radio Corporations.

The original target date for turnover of operations to the Germans and the withdrawal of American operating personnel was set at 30 June 1946. This date was not met, and in June all stations were still operating as Military

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents missing at present].

Government organs.<sup>79</sup> Preliminary work on the formation of German radio corporations had been accomplished by the *Länderrat*, however. The *Länder* had agreed to set up independent corporations which would operate the existing studio and transmitter facilities and would cooperate on network matters and technical questions. Charters for the corporations were being prepared in order to eliminate the possibility of political interference in broadcasting and to insure that radio would fairly represent all elements of the population.

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents missing at present].

## VII. FILMS

### A. General

#### 1. Scope.

Film Control included control of the activities of production, distribution, exhibition and processing of all motion picture film, including religious and educational subjects.<sup>80</sup>

#### 2. Principal Tasks.

The principal tasks of Film Control were to find and recommend suitable Germans to be licensed as film producers and as film exhibitors, and to guide and control the reconstitution of the German film industry.<sup>81</sup>

#### 3. Background.

##### a. First Phase.

Upon the entry of American Forces into Germany, all German produced films were impounded. Under the provisions of Military Government Law No. 191, all cinemas remain closed until 30 July 1945.

##### b. Second Phase.

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<sup>80</sup> MG Regulations, Title 21, para 21-600

<sup>81</sup> Ibid, para 21-601

On 30 July 16 motion picture theaters were opened.<sup>82</sup> The films shown, however, were supplied by Military Government and included only US documentaries. Prior to the end of the war a list of 48 films had been compiled by a review board of the Office of War Information in New York for showing in the theaters of the US Zone.<sup>83</sup> A group of documentaries and industrial short subject films was also ready for showing.

#### B. Newsreel.

In addition to films provided by the Office of War Information, a joint British-American newsreel, *Welt im Film* ("The World in Film") was supplied to all motion picture exhibitors. First produced in London, by September 1945 this newsreel operation had been transferred to the Bavaria *Filmkunst* Studios, near Munich. In December this British-American project was supplemented by the addition of Russian and French material. Approximately 50% of the newsreel was devoted to German domestic news, 25% to US and British and the remaining 25% to general world coverage.<sup>84</sup>

#### C. Motion Picture Theaters.

Although at the end of July 1945 only 16 motion picture theaters had

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<sup>82</sup> USFET Circular 120 (1 Sept 45)

<sup>83</sup> AGWAR to USFET Cable No WCL-28005 (12 Dec 45)

<sup>84</sup> MG Monthly Report, ICD, No. 13 (20 Aug 46) [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents missing at present].

been allowed to open, by December 345 were in operation, showing approved German films. During the first six months of 1946 this number was increased to 693.

#### D. German Films.

##### 1. Existing Films.

When the U.S. Army entered Germany, all German-produced films were impounded, and were later brought to two main collecting points, Frankfurt and Munich. After careful analysis, an initial group of approved films was released in December 1945. By June 1946, 43 films had been distributed; of these, 15 were German feature films, all produced prior to the occupation of Germany; eight were German produced documentary films; and 30 were juvenile short-subject films.<sup>85</sup>

##### 2. Production of German Films.

Before the war the Bavaria *Filmkunst* Studios at Geiselgestig, near Munich, were the third-largest in Germany. When the Americans arrived, film officers immediately took charge, inventoried the studios and requisitioned the facilities. In September 1945 they were opened for the production of the newsreel *Welt im Film*.

By the end of June 1946, no other films had yet been produced in

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<sup>85</sup> Ibid [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents missing at present].

Germany since the war, and the German Film Industry had not yet entered its third phase of development envisioned by the Information Control Division. It was expected, however, that film production would be resumed by the beginning of 1947. Plans called for a complete separation of actual production from operation of the studios. Distribution would also be an independent operation, both in organization and financial set-up. Although no formal licenses had been issued, six applications for film production licenses had been approved.<sup>86</sup>

#### E. Film Exchange.

Tentative agreement was reached in July 1945 on free inter-distribution of US, Russian, British, and approved German films in all sectors of Berlin.<sup>87</sup> However, quadripartite arrangements for inter-zonal exchange of feature films were not completed until March 1946. In anticipation of the first official meeting of the quadripartite Information Subcommittee of the Political Directorate, informal conferences were held by film representatives of the four powers. In addition to the agreements on exchange of full-length pictures between the various zones, it was decided that further exchanges would be arranged between the various sectors of Berlin.

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents missing at present].

<sup>87</sup> ICD, USGCC Report, "Information Control in Germany" (25 Sept 45) [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents missing at present].

## F. Public Opinion.

A survey of reactions of German civilians to a program of short films which was made at Erlangen in August 1945, showed that the overwhelming majority considered the program not as propaganda but as unbiased factual information. Although most moviegoers expressed a desire for feature films and for German films, they showed that their interest was most keenly aroused by educational films showing new and liberal methods of fostering democratic ways of life. The animated cartoon on the program, which drew the applause of the younger members of the audience because of its skill and humor, had less universal appeal than the film of the modern American nursery school. The two straight documentaries, one of life in the Midwestern American town somewhat idealized, the other a pastoral version of the harvest in England, left the audience more or less indifferent.<sup>88</sup>

During March, *Die Todesmühlen* ("Mills of Death"), a documentary film on concentration camp atrocities, completed its run in US occupied areas. Attendance was generally normal in Greater Hesse, Württemberg-Baden and Bremen, but in Bavaria, where the film was shown in February, it was well above normal. In Berlin, however, attendance dropped to 26% of capacity. Popular reactions indicated that those who saw the film were at least convinced of the existence of concentration camps, even if in most cases they

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<sup>88</sup> MG Monthly Report, ICD, No. 9 (20 Apr 46) [Not to be used in final documentation. Supporting documents missing at present].

did not accept personal responsibility for them.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> This note is not provided in the original.

## VIII. THEATER AND MUSIC

### Part I. Theater and Music Control

#### 1. Scope.

Theater and Music Control includes control of the publication and distribution of music, the recording and distribution of mechanical reproductions, and control of all theatrical activities such as plays, operettas, musical comedies, plays with incidental music, variety, cabaret, ballet, dance recitals, fairs, circuses, carnivals, concerts, operas, recitals and public music of any kind, and any other "live" entertainment employing actors (or musicians).<sup>90</sup>

#### 2. Principal Tasks.

The principal tasks of Theater and Music Control are to find and recommend suitable Germans to be licensed as theatrical and musical producers, as publishers of music, and as producers of mechanical recordings, to find and recommend suitable Germans for registration, and to guide and control the reconstitution of German theater and music.<sup>91</sup>

#### 3. Background.

Theater and music have a great tradition in Germany. In the previously

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<sup>90</sup> No information was provided for this and following footnotes indicated in the original.

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existing small states, independent sovereigns promoted and subsidize both media and in many towns as a means of presenting the cultural achievements of their principalities to the outside world. This explains why the German theater did not tend to centralize itself in the capital. Only a few privately owned theaters existed, mainly in the larger cities such as Berlin, Hamburg and Munich. In order to combat the tendency of German governments to dominate cultural life, therefore, the Information Control Division from the first devoted special efforts to the encouragement of private theaters throughout Germany.

#### 4. Procedure.

In the first phase of control, of course, as in all other media of information and entertainment, German theaters and German music were banned.<sup>92</sup> However, since both theater and music were such an integral part of German cultural life, it was considered essential that they be revived as soon as possible.

##### a. Problems.

This task was complicated by a number of problems. Chief of these was a shortage of theaters. Many of them had been destroyed during the war; those which were only slightly damaged and could be

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repaired were needed for the entertainment of American troops. Another problem was the selection of qualified artists and entertainers who were not politically tainted.

#### 1) Damaged Theaters.

One of the greatest handicaps, a shortage of theaters, was due to the fact that theaters were generally located in the heart of the town and were consequently destroyed. In August 1945 more managers had been licensed than there were theaters to accommodate them.

#### 2) Entertainment of Troops.

In the beginning US Army Special Services, providing entertainment for the troops, had priority on the use of theaters. Those which were not too badly damaged were also used as clubs, or, occasionally, as troop billets. However, early in August 1945 Special Services and the Information Control Division reached an agreement on the use of theaters. In the localities where several theaters existed, at least one building was reserved for German civilian entertainment; where facilities were limited, they were used by both troops and civilians on a part-time basis.

### 3) Denazification.

In August 1945, it was thought that denazification in the field of entertainment was easier than in the other fields of information control, and the progress into phase 3 was being made more rapidly.<sup>93</sup> It was later recognize, however, that in this field, where there is usually very little coincidence between personal politics and professional ability, it was necessary to overcome the tendency to excuse the behavior of certain artists on grounds that their talent was essential.<sup>94</sup> In other words, it was necessary to curb the impulse to insure high quality in the German theater at the price of lowering denazification standards. For this reason licenses which had been granted to several prominent German artists and musicians were later revoked.

#### b. Unions.<sup>95</sup>

Since the German theater and theater guilds had been completely taken over by the Nazis, the theatrical and musical fields were revived by Military Government without the assistance of these guilds.

However, in December 1945 the German stage union, the

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<sup>95</sup> Editor's Note: The original document has no point "a."

*Genossenschaft deutscher Bühnenangehöriger* (Brotherhood of German Theater Personnel) was reorganized in Frankfurt, and similar unions of musicians, actors and artists were reestablished in other major cities. Social advances made by the *Genossenschaft* prior to 1933 were again put into effect.<sup>96</sup>

c. Licensing.

The artists who are permitted to appear were selected for ability and screened for political acceptability as in other fields. As the Information Control program advanced, committees composed of representatives of German theater unions and independent experts were established to assist Theater and Music Officers in this selection.

This first step toward German direction of theater and music was taken in March 1946 with the establishment in Stuttgart of a special examination board to conduct preliminary screening of applicants for theatrical work.<sup>97</sup> This board, called the *Prüfungsausschuss* ( Board of Examination), was similar to several others which had been formed experimentally, but because of its unusually democratic composition it was the first to be allowed a large measure of responsibility.

The *Prüfungsausschuss* was made up of delegates of the theater

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and music unions, representatives of the *Land* and city cultural ministries, and a number of private citizens, all with clean political records. Theater and music producers seeking licenses, as well as concert performers, actors, entertainers or theater owners wishing to register with military government, were obliged to submit regular *Fragebogen*, or questionnaires, to the *Prüfungsausschuss*. The board in turn recommended to the field Information Control Unit in the area those applicants whom it believed should be accepted.

Although the board's decisions were not binding on Military Government, it appeared at the end of the month that most of its recommendations were being made in conformance with Military Government regulations. It was also decided to allow the *Land* governments to select theater intendants for tax supported institutions, provided those designated had received an official Military Government license, and to discharge an intendent provided his replacement held a license.

## Part II. Theater.

### 1. German Plays.

Beginning in July 1945 the number of theaters offering German plays increased steadily throughout the US Zone and in Berlin. During October, for example, approximately 50 programs were scheduled, ranging from light musical comedy to opera, and from variety shows to *MacBeth*.<sup>98</sup> In Berlin in particular, the rapid development of the theater was encouraging. Sitting in a desert of rubble in the heart of Berlin and still unheated, the Hebbel Theater was becoming a landmark in the theatrical world.

In addition to theaters in the principal cities a number of active repertory theaters were developed during March in eleven Bavarian cities. Others, including peasant theaters, soon appeared in smaller towns, where performances were presented by traveling legitimate theater and variety troupes. By the end of June 1946, a total of 241 theater licenses had been granted.

### 2. American Plays.

As early as July 1945, the Office of War Information was requested to obtain rights to certain American plays with a view to their future production for German audiences. In August, the Information Control Division continued to receive requests for rights to produce American plays in translation for

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German audiences, but the delay in obtaining clearance from the Dramatists' Guild in the United States had prevented any from being shown at that time.

These arrangements were eventually completed, however. On 6 November, the Hebbel Theater in Berlin presented Ardrey's *Thunder Rock*, the first modern American play to be shown in that city in a decade. In Berlin also during November the famous German producer, Juergen Fehling, was licensed and presented as his second production Eugene O'Neill's *Anna Christie*, which he had read in a bomb shelter during the war. (Author's note: not licensed when he produced his first play?)

In July 1946, copyrights to 40 US plays had been cleared for performance in Germany, and 20 of them had been translated into German and distributed to theaters.<sup>99</sup>

The general reaction of the German people to the plays already was extremely favorable. Eugene O'Neill, Thornton Wilder, Robert Sherwood, Clifford Odets, Elmer Rice and William Saroyan were especially popular.

### 3. Opera.

Opera, which has always occupied a prominent place in German cultural life, was soon revived. By the end of June 1946, a large number of cities throughout the zone had their own opera companies. (?) A boon to opera in Germany was the discovery, in a salt mine near Heimbaldshausen, of a large

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cache of costumes belonging to the Berlin State Opera company; these costumes were distributed to opera companies in the four zones of occupation. (?)

### Part III. Music.

#### 1. Performances.

The first licensed musical performances took place simultaneously in Munich and Stuttgart on 8 July 1945. Concerts were begun in Frankfurt and Wiesbaden on 29 July. These performances were given regularly, and in each case were sold out long in advance. By September, arrangements had been made to transmit some of the musical programs, particularly on Sundays, over the radio network. Survey showed that a total of 73 music licenses had been granted during the year ending in June 1946.<sup>100</sup>

#### 2. American Music.

Contemporary American music, which until March 1946 had not been available to Germans since 1933, was included in German concerts on an increasing scale. Among the first works to be played were Howard Hanson's "Third Symphony," Walter Piston's suite "The Incredible Flutist," Samuel Barber's "Adagio," and chamber music by Charles Ives. At the end of June 1946 more than 100 American musical works had been released for

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performance in Germany. Compositions by Aaron Copland, William Schuman, Walter Piston, Samuel Barber, and other American composers were well received by German concert-goers.<sup>101</sup>

### 3. Licensing.

#### a. Determining Factors.

One of the most complicated tasks of Information Control was to determine whether or not an artist should also be judged on political as well as on artistic grounds. The first concrete case involved the noted pianist, Walter Giesecking. Investigations showed that during the Nazi regime he had served not only as an artist, but also as a propagandist. His concerts at home and in occupied countries had been planned and arranged by the Propaganda Ministry, to exhibit the accomplishments of the glorified Nazi *Kultur*.

The thorough study made in the Giesecking case served as a model for others of a similar nature. It showed that the Reich Music Chamber, an offshoot of the Propaganda Ministry, had reached into every hamlet of Germany to marshal the music talents of the German people in support of Nazi propaganda. It resulted in the decision that artists who had allowed their talents to be used by the Nazis for propaganda purposes were in the same class with writers and publishers who had sold out to Hitler. They

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had to be banned, at least initially, from their work in a new Germany that was to be built along democratic lines. This standard of judgment was also used during February in deciding the case of Wilhelm Furtwaengler, a noted German conductor who during the Hitler regime had served as director of the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra.

b. Blacklists.

In order to present a guide to information control officers in the transfer of the media from Military Government operation to licensed German operation, the first black list was published in October.<sup>102</sup> It included the names of all Germans who it was considered necessary to keep out of the information and particularly entertainment media, and was completed after long research by intelligence personnel.

The inclusion in the blacklist of a number of well-known names in the musical and theatrical world resulted in the departure of these persons from the American zone to seek employment in other areas. It was expected, however, that a blacklist effective throughout Germany would be published shortly so that an artist already blacklisted in one zone would be automatically blacklisted in another.

To be Written Later:

IX. QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENTS

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X. CONCLUSION

XI. CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY